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RICHARDSON 11. HAll

[L. A. No. 23537.

(

In Bank.

[44 C.2d

June 29, 1955.]

JAMES RICHARDSON et a1., Respondents, v. HERBERT
HAM et aI., Appellants.
BEN W. BARNETT et aI., Respondents, v. HERBERT HAM
et aI., Appellants.
MARCO J. MEDIN, JR., et aI., Respondents, v. HERBERT
HAM et at, Appellants.
[1] New Trial-Insufficiency of Evidence-Powers of Trial Oourt.
-In passing on motion for new trial based on insufficiency of
evidence, it is exclusive province of trial court to judge credibility of witnesses, detennine probative force of testimony,
and weigh evidence.
[2] Id.-Insufilciency of Evidence-Powers of Trial Oourt.-Trial
court, in considering sufficiency of evidence on motion for new
trial based on insutliciency of evidence, may draw inferences
opposed to those drawn at trial, and where only conflicts consist of inferences deduced from uncontradicted probative facts,
court may resolve such conflicts in determining whether case
should be retried.
[3] Id.-Insufficiency of Evidence-Discretion - Review.-Appellate court will reverse trial court's order granting motion for
new trial for insufficiency of evidence only where it can be
said as matter of law that there is no substantial evidence to
support contrary judgment.
[4] Automobiles-Proximate Oause of Injury-Intervening Oauses.
-Automobiles do not arouse curiosity, and ordinarily the only
appreciable risk that they will be set in motion if left unattended arises from possibility of their being stolen.
[6] Id.-New Trial-Insufficiency of Evidence.-In actions against
owners of bulldozer for in.iuries arising out of its use by youthful vandals at night, evidence is sufficient to ,justify conclusion
that there was a reasonably foreseeable risk that defendants'
bulldozers might be tampered with when left unattended, and
thus supports granting of plaintiffs' motions for new trial for
insufficiency of evidence to sustain verdicts for defendants,
where such bulldozers aroused curiosity and attracted specta-

[1] See Oal.Jur., New Trial, § 70; Am.Jur., New Trial, § 129
et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] New Trial, § 89; [3] New Trial,
§ 99; [4, 6, 7, 9] Automobiles, § 154; [5] Automobiles, § 362-2;
[8] Negligence, § 16.
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tors, curious persons had been known to climb on them, and
it could reasonably be inferred that they were attractive to
children when left unattended at end of working day.
Id. - Proximate Cause of Injury -Intervening Causes.-Extreme danger created by bulldozer in uncontrolled motion and
foreseeable risk of intermeddling justify imposing duty on
owner to exercise reasonable care to protect third persons from
injuries arising from its operation by intermeddlers.
Id.-Proximate Cause of Injury-Intervening Causes.-There
is substantial evidence that defendants did not exercise reasonable care to prevent intermeddlers from setting their bulldozer in motion where it is shown that engine could be started
with bulldozer in gear and, if so started, bulldozer would commence to move immediately, and where, though this risk could
be avoided by use of simple but effective lock, no such lock
was used.
Negligence-Proximate Cause-Intervening Causes.-If realizable likelihood that third person may act in particular manner
is hazard or one of hazards which makes actor negligent, such
act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent actor from being liable for harm caused
thereby.
Automobiles-Proximate Cause of Injury-Intervening Causes.
-In actions against owners of bulldozer for injuries arising
out of its use by youthful vandals at night, possibility of intentional, wrongful misconduct that occurred when such
youths, being unable to stop bulldozer after racing it on top
of mesa, abandoned it and it ran wild over edge of mesa down
hill, was not too remote to constitute hazard that would justify
conclusion that defendants' failure to lock bulldozer was
negligent, and accordingly defendants' duty to protect plaintiffs from injuries caused by uncontrolled and unauthorized
operation of their bulldozer included duty to protect plaintiffs
from intentional misconduct of such youths, and such misconduct did not constitute superseding cause of plaintiff's
harm.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego
County granting new trials. John A. Hewicker, Judge. Affirmed.
Actions for damages for personal injuries and property
damage arising out of use of bulldozer by third persons.
Orders granting plaintiffs new trials, affirmed.
•
[8] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 17 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence,

167 et seq.
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Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye, James W. Archer, Ward W.
Waddell, Jr., and Thomas C. Ackerman, Jr., for Appellants.
McInnis, Hamilton & Fitzgerald, William T. Fitzgerald,
• Franklin B. Orfield, Thomas P. Golden and Hubert L. Rose
for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants, members of a construction
contracting partnership, were engaged in earth moving operations in the development of a new subdivision located on
top of a mesa in San Diego County. In their work they used
two 26-ton Allis-Chalmers bulldozers, which were operated
by two of their employees. The bulldozers did not have electrical ignition systems, and they could be started by pushing
the compression lever in and stepping on the starter. The
engine was stopped by pulling the compression lever out.
They were equipped with fluid drives and could be started
in gear, in which case they would commence to move as soon
as the engine started. No locks were supplied with the bulldozers by the manufacturer, but the local dealer had improvised a lock that would prevent starting. It consisted of
a metal sleeve welded to a padlock that locked around the
starter rod thereby preventing the starter from operating.
The lock provided by the dealer for one of the bulldozers
was lost, and defendants improvised a substitute. At the close
of the working day on Saturday, July 5, 1952, the operators
of the bulldozers parked them near one another on top of
the mesa. One of them was locked by the dealer's lock, and
there is evidence that as to the other, only the padlock, but
not the sleeve of the improvised lock, was put around the
starter rod. The padlock alone would not prevent the starter
from operating. The following evening three young men,
aged 17, 18, and 20, after drinking intoxicants, decided to
go for a drive with thc wife of one of them. While driving,
one of them mentioned having seen the bulldozers, and they
decided to go to the mesa for the purpose of racing them.
On their arrival, two of the young men left the car and
attempted to start the bulldozers. They were unable to start
the bulldozer equipped with the dealer's lock but succeeded
in starting the other bulldozer. They drove it around the mesa
for 15 to 30 minutes causing considerable damage, and then,
being unable to stop it, headed it toward a canyon to the
east of the mesa and abandoned it. It went off the edge of
the mesa, down the hill, across a freeway, and traveled for
'\
/

I
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about a mile before it was halted by a retaining wall and a
utility pole. During the course of its journey it traveled
through a house and seriously in3ured the occupants. It also
collided with a house-trailer and an automobile causing
further property damage and personal injuries. Plaintiffs,
whose persons or property were in the path of the bulldozer,
brought these actions for damages against defendants alleging
that they were negligent in leaving the bulldozer unattended
and unlocked. The actions were consolidated for trial, and
the jury returned verdicts for defendants. The trial court
granted motions for a new trial on the grounds of insufficiency
of the evidence and misconduct of the jury. Defendants
appeal.
[1] "In passing upon a motion for a new trial based upon
the insufficiency of the evidence, it is the exclusive province
of the trial cOUrt to judge the credibility of the witnesses,
determine the probative force of testimony, and weigh the
evidence [citations]. [2] In considering the sufficiency of
the evidence upon such motion the court may draw inferences
opposed to those drawn at the trial [citation], and where the
only conflicts consist of inferences deduced from uncontradicted probative facts, the court may resolve such conflicts
in determining whether the case should be retried [citation].
[8] It is only where it can be said as a matter of law that
there is no substantial evidence to support a contrary judgment that an appellate court will reverse the order of the
trial court." (Brooks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 00., 27 Ca1.2d
305, 307 [163 P.2d 689] ; see also Ball.ard v. Pacific Greyhound
Lines, 28 Ca1.2d 357, 359 [170 P.2d 465] ; Mazzotta v. LoB
Angeles Ry. Oorp., 25 Ca1.2d 165, 168 [153 P.2d 338] ; Martin
v. Smith, 103 Cal.App.2d 894, 897-898 [230 P.2d 679], and
cases cited; 3 Witkin, California Procedure 2062.)
Defendants contend that there is no substantial evidence
that would support a judgment against them. They rely
on the recent decision of this court in Rickards v. Stanley,
43 Ca.l.2d 60 [271 P.2d 23], holding that, in the absence of
special circumstances, the duty of an owner of an automobile
to exercise reasonable care in the management thereof does
not include a duty to remove the ignition key to protect
persons on the highway from the negligent driving of a thiif.
Since, however, the kinds of foreseeable intervening conduct
by third parties as well as the risks created by such conduct
in this case are materially different from those considered
in the Richards case, that case is not controlling here.

......

...
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[4] Automobiles do not arouse curiosity, and ordinarily
the only appreciable risk that they will be set in motion if
they are left unattended arises from the possibility of their
being stolen. [5] The record in the present case, on the other
"hand, shows that defendants' bulldozers aroused curiosity
and attracted spectators, while they were in operation as well
as while they were parked for the night. Moreover, curious
persons had been known to climb on them, and it could reasonably be inferred that they were attractive to children
when left unattended at the end of the working day. The
evidence is therefore sufficient to justify the conclusion that
there was a reasonably foreseeable risk that defendants' bulldozers might be tampered with when left unattended.
Given this foreseeable risk of intermeddling, the question
is presented whether defendants were under a duty to exercise reasonable eare to prevent intermeddlers from putting
their bulldozers in operation. In the Richards case it was
concluded that even if theft was rpasonably to be foreseen,
the owner was under no duty to persons on the highway to
exercise reasonable care to keep his car out of the hands of
a thief. It was pointed out that the owner will ordinarily
ha ve no reason to foresee that a thief will be an incompetent
driver, that the risk of negligent driving arising from possible theft is less than the risl{ that the owner might intentionally create without negligence by lending his car to
another, and that it would be anomalous to impose greater
liability when the car was being driven by a thief than that
provided by statute when the owner voluntarily entrusts his
car to another. The risks arising from intermeddling with
bulldozers, however, are entirely different from those arising
from the driving of an automobile by a thief. Bulldozers are
relatively uncommon, and curious children or others attracted
by them ordinarily will not know how to operate them. An
intermeddler who starts a bulldozer accidentally or otherwise
may not be able to stop it, and the potentialities of harm
from a 26-ton bulldozer in ullcontrollpd motion are enormous,
parti('ularly when it is left on top of a mesa from which
it can escape and injun' Pf~rsons nnd property located below.
[6] The extreme danger created by a bulldozer in uncontrolll'u motion and tht' forps(,pahlp risk of intermeddling fully
justify imposing a duty on the owner to exercise reasonable
care to protC'et third nartirs from injurip-s nri~ing from its
operation by intl'rnH'ddlers. (See.J ensen v. Minard, ante,
pp. 325. a27. :~28 r282 P.2cl 71: Worner v. Santa Catalina
Island Co., ante, pp. 310, 317 [282 P.2d 12], and cases cited.)
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[7] In the absence of an effective lock the bulldozer engine
could be started by pushing in a lever and stepping on the
starter. Moreover, the engine could be started with the
bulldozer in gear, and if so started, the bulldozer would
commence to move immediately. AIt.hough this risk could
be avoided by the use of a simple but effective lock, there is
evidence that no such lock was used. Accordingly, there is
substantial evidence that defendants did not exercise reasonable care to prevent intermeddlers from setting their bulldozer in motion.
It is contended, however, that even if defendants were
under a duty to protect plaintiffs from injuries from operation of the bulldozer caused by ordinary intermeddlers, they
were not under a duty to protect plaintiffs from intprmeddlers
who deliberately undertook to operate the bulldozer, or, in
other words, that the intentional misconduct of the young
men constituted a superseding cause of plaintiffs' injuries.
(See Rest. Torts, § 448.) [8] It is settled. however. that" If
the realizable likelihood that a third person may act in a
particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which
makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent,
negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent
the actor from being liable fo1' harm causf'il thpreby." (Rest.
Torts, § 449; McEvoy v. American Pool Corp .. 32 Cal.2d 295.
298-299 [195 P.2d 783] ; Benton v. Sloss, 38 Ca1.2d 399. 405
r240 P.2d 575].) [9] The possibility of the intentional,
wrongful misconduct that occurred in this casf' was not so
remote as not to constitute "one of the hazards" that would
justify the conclusion that defendants' failure to lock the
bulldozer was negligent. Accordingly, defendants' duty to
protect plaintiffs from injuries causeo by the nncontrolJed
and unauthorized operation of their bulldozer included a duty
to protect plaintiffs from the intentional misconduct of the
young men, and such misconduct did not therefore constitute
a superseding cause of plaintiffs' harm.
Since the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's
granting of plaintiffs' motions for a new trial, it is unnecessary
to decide whether the orders might also hI' sustained on thp.
ground of the alleged misconduct of the jury.
The orders are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.

'.

SPENCE, J.-I concur in the affirmance of the orders
granting a new trial, as there was alllple evidence to sustain

)
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a finding that defendants were negligent, and that such negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiffs' damage. I also
agree that this case is distinguishable from Richards v. Stanley,43 Ca1.2d 60 [271 P.2d 23], but I still adhere to the views
expressed by my dissenting opinion in the Richards case•
•
CARTER, J.-I concur in the jUdgment of affirmance,
but as I read the majority opinion it seeks to establish a
standard of conduct based upon the view of those members
of the court joining in said opinion without regard to considerations of public policy and the experience of people
generally in the ordinary walks of life. It does not appear
that the Legislature has established a standard of conduct
for those owning, possessing and operating heavy equipment
of the character here involved, and such standard must, therefore, be determined under the rules of the common law which
accepts as its criterion the conduct of a reasonably prudent
person. The determination of this standard, is, of course, in
the first instance, for the trier of fact; that is, it is for the
trier of fact to determine from the evidence presented whether
or not the conduct of the defendants in the instant case was
that of a reasonably prudent person. If the trier of fact
determines that such conduct was not that of a reasonably
prudent person under all the circumstances, the deduction
to be drawn from such determination is that the defendants
were negligent. There can be no question but that the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiffs here to exercise ordinary
care in the control and management of their equipment so
that it would not inflict injury upon plaintiffs without fault
on their part. Here, the trial court by granting plaintiffs'
motion for a new trial on the ground of the insufficiency of
the evidence has determined in the first instance that defendants' conduct was not that of a reasonably prudent
person and that they violated their duty when they so managed
and controlled their equipment as to inflict injury upon plaintiffs. The District Court of Appeal by unanimous decision
agreed with this determination of the trial court. (Richardson
v. Ham Bros. Oonst. 00., ·(Cal.App.) 275 P.2d 532.) This
determination was based upon the evidence presented to the
trial court, and that court in the exercise of its fact finding
power determined that defendants had deviated from the
standard of conduct of a reasonably prudent person. This is
the process by which the common law has been developed

June 1955]
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and it has never been the function of an appellate court in
cases of this character to arbitrarily establish standards of
conduct upon which liability mayor may not be predicated.
In discussing the development of the common law with
respect to negligence Mr. Justice Holmes in his work entitled
The Common Law makes the following illuminating observation:
"The cases which have raised difficulties needing explanation are those in which the court has ruled that there was
prima facie evidence of negligence, or some evidence of negligence to go to the jury.
"Many have noticed the confusion of thought implied in
speaking of such cases as presenting mixed questions of law
and fact. No doubt, as has been said above, the averment
that the defendant has been guilty of negligence is a complex
one: first, that he has done or omitted certain things; second,
that his alleged conduct does not come up to the legal
standard. And so long as the controversy is simply on the
first half, the whole complex averment is plain matter for
the jury without special instructions, just as a question of
ownership would be where the only dispute was as to the
fact upon which the legal conclusion was founded. But when
a controversy arises on the second half, the question whether
the court or the jury ought to judge of the defendant's
conduct is wholly unaffected by the accident, whether there
is or is not also a dispute as to what that conduct was. If
there is such a dispute," it is entirely possible to give a series
of hypothetical instructions adapted to every state of facts
which it is open to the jury to find. If there is no such dispute,
the court may still take their opinion as to the standard.
The problem is to explain the relative functions of court
and jury with regard to the latter.
"When a case arises in which the standard of conduct,
pure and simple, is submitted to the jury, the explanation is
plain. It is that the court, not entertaining any clear views
of public policy applicable to the matter, derives the rule to
be applied from daily experience, as it has been agreed that
the great body of the law of tort has been derived. But the
court further feels thAt it is not itself possessed of sufficient
practical experience to lay down the rule intelligently. " It
conceives that twelve men taken from the practical part' of
the community can aid its judgment. Therefore it aids its
conscience by taking the opinion of the jury." (The Common
Law, by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., pp. 122-123.)

)
".".
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As stated above, the standard of conduct applicable to a
particular factual situation-whether it was that of a reasonably prudent persoll-must be derived from daily experience.
and a jury or trial judge is in a better position than an
.appellate court to make such determination. It seems clear
that the only test the courts can apply in determining whether
the conduct complained of was that of a reasonably prudent
person is the reasonable minds test. (Johnson v. Southern
Pac. R. 00., 154 Cal. 285 [97 P. 520] ; Seller v. Market St.
Ry. 00., 139 Cal. 268 [72 P. 1006] ; Herbert v. Southern Pac.
00., 121 Cal. 227 [53 P. 651] ; Zibbell v. Southern Pac. 00.,
160 Cal. 237 [116 P. 513]; see dissenting opinion, Gray v.
Brinkerhoff, 41 Ca1.2d 180, 186, 192 [258 P.2d 834].) That
reasonable minds differ as to whether defendants' conduct
was that of a reasonably prudent person is demonstrated by
the record before us which discloses that the trial judge, the
three members of the District Court of Appeal and a majority
of this court agree that their conduct was such that negligence may be inferred therefrom. A question of fact is
therefore presented, and the ruling of the trial court in
granting a new trial on insufficiency of the evidence must
be upheld unless settled rules of law are disregarded.
Just to show that a conflict existed in the evidence, and
in the inferences to be drawn therefrom, let us look at the
facts and the inferences which may have motivated the trial
court in its action in granting plaintiffs a new trial on the
ground of insufficiency of the evidence:
The bulldozer in question was parked at the top of a mesa.
After the intoxicated youths found they were unable to stop
it, they abandoned italld it went off the edge of the mesa,
down the hill, across a freeway causing personal injuries and
property damage on its way. The inference to be drawn from
the evidence relating to its position was that it was at the
top of a hill and that the only place for it to go was down.
The plaintiffs' injuries themselves carry the inference that it
was left unattended in a place where it could cause injury if
molested by untrained persons. Herbert Ham, one of the
defendant owners, testified (by deposition) that he remembered seeing people drive up to look at the bulldozers; that
he may have seen strangers get on the machines; that he had
chased people away from the bulldozers mostly when they
were not running; that all employees had verbal instructions
to chase onlookers away from the maeh i nes; that he was
afraid someone might be hurt if strangers got on the bull-

)
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dozers; that the bulldozers were supposed to be locked with a
sleeve and padlock which had been improvised to keep the
machines immobilized. The inferences to be drawn, or which
may have been drawn by the trial court, from this evidence
were that defendants were aware that the bulldozers attracted the curious, "mostly" when they were not running;
that defendants were aware that injury might result if
strangers got on the machines; that the locks therefor were
necessary to prevent just such an occurrence as the one here
involved, and that if any untrained person started the machine
it would be a danger both to themselves and others. Finney,
an oiler, whose duty it was to lubricate the machines, testified
that he had seen people in and about the general area where
the bulldozers were parked; that these people were watching
the bulldozers operate; that he had seen people there when he
left at night; that he did the oiling after the drivers (or cat
skinners) left for the night; that he was supposed to lock
the machines when he was through wor]{. A logical inference
from this is that the defendants knew people were around
in the vicinity of the parked bulldozers after all employees
had left and that he was to lock the machines so that they
would not be meddled with by curious strangers. Schlickelman, a cat skinner for defendants testified tbat there was
no guard on duty to watch the equipment; tbat when be had
been there at closing time he had seen people from 50 to 100
feet away watching the bulldozers; that he had seen people
of all ages watching the machines; that he didn't remember
whether any had gotten. in the tractor while he had been
around. It could be reasonably inferred from this that defendants knew that numbers of people of all ages were around
the area where the bulldozers were parked at closing time.
Finney, the oiler, testified that to start the machines, a
lever was pushed and a starter stepped on; that the machine
could be started in gear and would move right off without
pressing an accelerator; that it was similar to fluid drive
except that it would start in gear. It could be inferred from
this that it would be a simple matter for a curious person
to start the machine without knowing how to stop it.
Summing up this evidence together with the inferences
therefrom, we see an unlocked piece of heavy equipII\ent
which had a fascination for people of all ages parked unattended at the top of a hill with the possibility of causing
untold damage to human life and property. We also see that
the defendants knew ourious onlookers were around the park-

)
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ing area at closing time; that orders were given to drive
these onlookers away; that the machines were supposed to be
kept locked because of the fear that some of the curious
might get on the machines and "hurt" somebody. It is
teasonable to infer that the machine itself, weighing 26 or 7
tons, would have a fascination which an ordinary automobile
would not have for the average person. It is also reasonable
to note that a bulldozer is a machine capable of doing great
bodily injury as well as property damage if in the hands
of one not skilled in its operation. From its very size and
complexity, it is reasonable to infer that once started in a
downward direction it could not be stopped until it came
to rest against an object sturdy enough to withstand its
momentum. It should also be noted that in its downward
course it would gain momentum and speed and that the force
with which it would strike anything in its path would be
greatly increased because of the added momentum and speed.
This evidence is most certainly sufficient to sustain a verdict for the plaintiffs had one been had; hence it was not
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant plaintiffs
a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence.
All persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent
others being injured as a result of their acts. Ordinary
care has been defined as that degree of care which people
of ordinarily prudent behavior could be reasonably expected
to exercise under the circumstances of a given case. In
other words, the care required must be in proportion to the
danger to be avoided and the consequences that might reasonably be anticipated (Orowe v. McBride, 25 Cal.2d 318, 321
[153 P.2d 727]; Hatzakorzian v. Rucker-Fuller Desk 00.,
197 Cal. 82, 98 [239 P. 709, 41 A.L.R. 1027] ; 19 Cal.Jur. 579;
Warner v. Santa Oatalina Island 00., ante, p. 310 [282
P.2d 12]). Section 447 of the Restatement of Torts sets forth
the rule with respect to the intervening act of a third person
as follows: "The fact that an intervening act of a third
person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner
does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another
which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about, if (a) the actor at the time of his negligent
conduct should have realized that a third person might so
act. . •. " This rule is applicable in California (Stasulat v.
Pacific Gas & Elec. 00., 8 Ca1.2d 631 [67 P.2d 678] ; Mosley
v. Arden Farms 00., 26 Ca1.2c1 213, 219 [157 P.2d 372, 158
A.L.R. 872]; Saw1ler v. Southern Calil. Gas Co., 206 Cal.
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866 [274 P. 544]). The evidence here shows without conflict
that defendants feared intermeddling by unauthorized persons; that they feared the tractors would be started by unauthorized persons; that they feared harm would come to
others because of such intermeddling. It seems too clear to
even warrant comment that the action taken by the intoxicated youths was reasonably foreseeable by defendants and
hence not a supervening independent cause of plaintiffs' injuries and property damage (Gall v. Union Ice 00., IDS Cal.
App.2d 303, 313 [239 P.2d 4S] ; Northwestern Nat. Ins. 00.
v. Rogers etc. Foundry, 73 Ca1.App.2d 442 [166 P.2d 401]).
Zuber v. Olarkson Oonst. 00., 363 Mo. 352 [251 S.W.2d
52], is a case very similar to the one presently under consideration. Defendant construction company owned large
motor-driven, earth-moving tractors which it left parked,
at the end of the day, on a levee with the machinery in gear
and the switches and ignitions unlocked with fuel in the
tanks and the breaks off ready to be easily put in operation.
The plaintiffs alleged that each evening curious spectators
were gathered around watching the machines; that some of
these persons had, to the defendant's knowledge, or the knowledge defendant should have had, theretofore started the
tractors; that the tractors were left unattended at the close
of the working day. It was alleged further that plaintiffs'
decedent was killed because of injuries sustained by the
unauthorized operation of one of defendant's unattended
tractors. The court there said: "It has been said a person
who is responsible for an instrumentality which is dangerous
and likely to cause injury to persons rightfully in its proximity is charged with taking appropriate precautions to
avoid injury to such persons, and his failure to take such
precantions constitutes negligence. . . . It has also been
stated that a negligent act may be one which creates a situation
which involves an unreasonable risk to another because of the
expectable action of a third person. Restatement, Torts, § 302.
"Relating to those dangers to be reasonably anticipatedif there is some probability or likelihood, not a mere possibility, of harm sufficiently serious that ordinary men would
take precautions to avoid it, then the failure to do so is
negligence. While the likelihood of a future happening is
the test of a duty to anticipate, this does not mean the chances
in favor of the happening must exceed those against it. The
test is not the balance of probabilities, but of the existence
of some probability of sufficient moment to induce the rea-
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aonable mind to take the precautions which would avoid it."
(251 S.W.2d 52, 55.) The court held that the machines, left
as they were, ready for operation were "potentially dangerous, and, if one were started by some reckless person or by
some intermeddler probably unskilled in the technique of
its operation, it would (and did) become a monstrous instrumentality of destruction. It seems to us it could be
reasonably said the person, defendant, the owner and responsible for these machines, with knowledge that curious
intermeddlers were maldng the practice of operating the
machines, had reason to anticipate or foresee that other intermeddlers would start the machines and that, among those
who operated the machines, some person, though an adult,
starting a machine would be reckless or unskilled. I t is not
too much to say that, in the circumstances averred, a reasonably prudent person should take into account these probabilities, and would foresee that some injury was likely to
ensue." (251 S.W.2d 52, 56.) There are two distinguishing
features to the Zuber case: it was alleged that defendant
knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known
that strangers had intermeddled with the machines and that
the machines were parked in a public place. Plaintiffs here
may, on a new trial, be able to produce additional evidence
and show that defendants lmew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that strangers had theretofore
tampered with the machines or might tamper with them. As
I have previously pointed out, a logical inference from the
instructions given to the employees by defendants to lock
the machines and chase the curious away is that defendants
had reason to fear the unauthorized actions of third persons.
Plaintiffs did allege that "said defendant well knew that said
tractor in its unlocked condition was a dangerous instrumentality." The trial judge in his wisdom, in the exercise
of his discretion, in the performance of his duty granted
plaintiffs a new trial believing, as he must have believed,
that the evidence was against the verdict and that plaintiffs
should have the further opportunity to produce additional
evidence in support of their allegations.
In Richards v. Stanley, 43 Ca1.2d 60, 63 [271 P.2d 23], it
was said in the majority opinion that "In the absence of
such a statute, however, it has generally been held that the
owner of an automobile is under no duty to persons who
may be injured by its use to keep it out of the hands of a
third person in the absellcc of facts puttillg the owner tm
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(Emphasis added.) While I do not agree with the last quoted
statement or with the majority opinion in the Stanley case,
it needs no citation of authority here to say that defendants
had knowledge that their machines were destructive forces
if driven, or meddled with. by persons not specially trained.
The record shows, without contradiction, that defendants
knew, and feared, that harm would come to others if the
machines were meddled with by untrained strangers. Section
449 of the Restatement of Torts states the rule as follows:
"If the realizable likelihood that a third person may act in
a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards
which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent,
negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent
the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby." (McEvoy v. American Pool Oorp., 32 Ca1.2d 295, 298-299 [195
P.2d 783].)
In order that an appellate court may reverse an order
of a trial court granting a new trial, it must be found that
the trial judge in so doing was guilty of a gross, manifest
and unmistakable abuse of discretion; it must also be found
that the trial judge violated his duty because it is his duty
to grant a new trial whenever in his opinion (not that of the
reviewing court) the evidence on which a decision rests is
insufficient to justify the decision. Under the facts as presented by this case, and the law as it stands in this state. how
can it possibly be said that the trial court abused its discretion'

